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We show how a Schumpeterian process of creative destruction can induce coordination in the
timing of entrepreneurial activities across diverse sectors of the economy. Consequently, a
multi–sector economy, in which sector–speci…c, productivity improvements are made by inde-
pendent, pro…t–seeking entrepreneurs, can exhibit regular booms, slowdowns and downturns
as an inherent part of the long–run growth process. The cyclical equilibrium that we study
has a higher long–run growth rate but lower welfare than the corresponding acyclical one. We
…nd that the cycles generated by our model share some features of actual business cycles, and
that across cycling economies, a negative relationship emerges between volatility and growth.
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1“The recurring periods of prosperity of the cyclical movement are the form progress
takes in capitalistic society.” (Joseph Schumpeter, 1927)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Are business cycles simply random shocks around a deterministic trend, or are there more fun-
damental linkages between short–run ‡uctuations and long–run growth? Although, in recent
times, macroeconomists have tended to study the sources of ‡uctuations and the determinants
of growth separately, there are several reasons to question this standard dichotomy. First, post
war cross–country evidence (e.g. Ramey and Ramey, 1995) suggests a signi…cant negative partial
correlation between volatility and growth, after controlling for standard growth correlates. This
correlation is economically signi…cant even amongst OECD countries. Second, while it is clear
that some portion of aggregate volatility is the result of exogenous disturbances, the recurring
asymmetry between the responses of the economy during upturns and downturns, is suggestive
of an endogenously determined component (see also Freeman, Hong and Peled, 1999). Third,
there is also increasing evidence that the strength of cyclical upturns are related to the depth of
preceding downturns (see Beaudry and Koop 1993 and Altissimo and Violante 2001). Finally,
even for ‡uctuations that are typically associated with obvious aggregate shocks, the causal links
are not clear.1
The view that growth and cycles are intimately linked is often associated with Schumpeter
(1927). He argued that growth occurs through a process of “creative destruction” — competition
amongst entrepreneurs in the search for new ideas that will render their rivals’ ideas obsolete. This
idea is central to modern theories of endogenous long run growth starting with Aghion and Howitt
(1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Sergestrom, Anant and Dinopolous (1990). However,
Schumpeter also argued that this process of entrepreneurial innovation is responsible for the
regular short–run ‡uctuations in economic activity, which he termed the “normal” business cycle.2
1For example, Zarnowitz (1998) argues that the US downturn in the early 1970s predates the 1973 oil price hike,
suggesting that this shock simply made an underlying cyclical movement worse.
2Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop an identical engine of growth to Grossman and Helpman (1991) but di¤er
in focusing on a model with a single innovating sector. Lumpy growth in Aghion and Howitt is possible, since there
is no reason that single sectors should experience smooth growth. However, except by coincidence, this cannot
explain the di¤used productivity improvements observed over the business cycle. See Phillips and Wrase (1999)
for further discussion.
1The key to explaining such business cycles, he argued, was to understand why entrepreneurial
activity would be clustered over time.
One source of clustering was suggested by Schumpeter himself: “... as soon as any step in a
new direction has been successfully made it, at once and thereby, becomes easy to follow... the
…rst success draws other people in its wake and …nally crowds of them, which is what the boom
consists of.” (Schumpeter, 1927). He further argued that there would be a downturn prior to
the boom as resources are allocated to learning and imitation. Recently, several authors have
formalized these “Schumpeterian cycles” in an attempt to understand their linkages to long–run
growth.3 However, these theories rely on the arrival of major technological breakthroughs that
in‡uence all sectors — a General Purpose Technology (GPT). While the GPT story may be
consistent with “long waves”, most studies …nd little evidence to support the notion that such
economy–wide advances can explain high frequency business cycles (see for example Jovanovic
and Lach 1997, Andolfatto and MacDonald, 1998).
An alternative theory of why activity in diverse sectors of the economy may be clustered is
developed by Shleifer (1986). He shows that, when imitation limits the longevity of monopoly
pro…ts, a strategic complementarity arises that could lead entrepreneurs to implement innovations
at the same time, even if the innovations themselves arrive uniformly through time. The clustering
o fi m p l e m e n t a t i o nr e s u l t si nab o o mi nl a b o rd e m a n d ,w h i c hi nt u r ng e n e r a t e st h eh i g hd e m a n d
for output necessary to support the boom. The temporary nature of the associated monopoly
pro…ts induces entrepreneurs to delay implementation until demand is maximized, so that a self–
reinforcing cycle arises. Shleifer interprets his theory as a formalization of Keynes’ (1936) notion
of “animal spirits”.
There are, however, several important limitations to Shleifer’s theory of implementation cycles.
Firstly, since innovations arrive exogenously, long–run growth is exogenous, so the theory has no
implications for the impact of cycles on growth. Secondly, because of the multiplicity of equilibria
that arise in his model, it is not possible to obtain precise predictions even for the e¤ect of growth
on cycles. Thirdly, the temporary nature of pro…ts relies on the assumption of drastic, but costless
imitation. It is not clear how robust the results would be to a less abrupt erosion of pro…ts. Finally,
3See, for example, Jovanovic and Rob (1990), Cheng and Dinopoulos (1992), Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998)
and Li (2000). The literature on Schumpeterian cycles is discussed by Aghion and Howitt (1998), who note that
GPTs are suited to generating Schumpeterian long waves. Though they discuss research on the high frequency
business cycle, they fall short of advocating GPTs as a method to understand it. The examples they emphasize
further support the long view: the steam engine, the electric dynamo, the laser, the computer.
2Shleifer’s theory depends critically on the impossibility of storage. If they could, innovators would
choose to produce when costs are low (i.e. before the boom), store the output and then sell it
when demand is high (i.e. in the boom). Such a pattern of production would undermine the
existence of cycles.4
In this article, we draw on the insights of Schumpeter (creative destruction) and Shleifer
(animal spirits), to develop a simple theory of endogenous, cyclical growth. We show how a multi–
sector economy, in which sector–speci…c, productivity improvements are made by independent,
pro…t–seeking entrepreneurs, can exhibit regular booms, slowdowns and downturns in economic
activity as an inherent part of the long–run growth process. We establish the existence of a
unique cyclical growth path along which the growth rate and the length and amplitude of cycles
are endogenously determined. Our theory does not rely on the arrival of GPTs nor on drastic
imitation, and allows for the possibility of storage. Speci…cally, we show that the process of
creative destruction itself can induce endogenous clustering of implementation and innovation.
C r e a t i v ed e s t r u c t i o ni m p l i e st h a t ,e v e ni fap a t e n to rt h ef e a ro fp r i c ec o m p e t i t i o nd i s s u a d e s
imitation, the dissemination of knowledge caused by implementation eventually leads to improve-
ments that limit a successful entrepreneur’s time of incumbency. Anticipating this, entrants will
optimally time implementation to ensure that their pro…ts arrive at a time of non-depressed ag-
gregate activity and that they maximize the length of their incumbency.5 It is these e¤ects which
lead to clustering in entrepreneurial implementation and, hence, to an aggregate level boom. If an
entrepreneur implements before the boom, he reveals the information underlying his productivity
improvement to potential rivals who may use this information in designing their own productivity
improvements. By delaying implementation until the boom he delays reaping the rewards but
maximizes his expected reign of incumbency. During the delay, entrepreneurs rely on maintaining
secrecy regarding the nature of the innovations that they hold.6
4Since questions of the timing of production and implementation clearly play an important role in producers’
minds, we believe the clustering of innovations underlying the theory should at least be robust to the possibility of
storage. For many goods, there is no reason to limit production to occuring only at the time of sale.
5For example, consider an entrepreneur’s decision to open a new branch outlet in a previously untried location.
The resources required in such an undertaking are not generally measured in o¢cial statistics as being separate
from directly productive activities, but are substantial nonetheless (e.g. planning, market surveying, …nancing,
hiring, contracting, negotiating, etc.). Moreover, the tacit knowledge so created in this process is not protected.
The knowledge that a branch outlet in a product line at a particular location is pro…table is valuable to future
entrepreneurs. Though careful to avoid setting up the same line and quality of store as the initial entrant, the
entrant’s pro…ts will induce some to search for alternative lines, and perhaps, higher qualities, that will allow them
to tap into this market. The fruits of these searches will eventually end the initial entrant’s reign of high pro…ts.
6As Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) document, …rms do indeed view secrecy as the best form of protection —
patenting is a less desired means of protecting knowledge.
3Our cycle not only features clustering of implementation, but also endogenous clustering of
innovation. It is this feature which generates the endogenous interactions between long–run
growth and short–run ‡uctuations. After the boom, wage costs are so high that it is initially
not pro…table to undertake new entrepreneurial activities. As the next boom approaches, how-
ever, the present value of new innovations grows until at some point it becomes pro…table to
allocate entrepreneurial e¤ort to innovation. As labor e¤ort is withdrawn from production, per
capita output (and measured productivity) gradually decline. Eventually it becomes pro…table
to implement the stock of innovations that have accumulated during the downturn, and the cycle
begins again.
We adopt a broad interpretation of innovation to include any improvement that is the outcome
of purposive design in search of pro…t.7 Entrepreneurs are the source of re…nements to process,
organization and product improvements that increase productivity within narrowly de…ned sec-
tors. The knowledge created by such entrepreneurial activity is both tacit and sector-speci…c.
Unlike R & D, or scienti…c knowledge, the improvements created may not be formally expressible
(as in a blueprint or design) and need not lend themselves to protection by patent. It is our view
that such mundane entrepreneurial decisions are the major source of high frequency productivity
improvements, not the patentable R & D improvements of a laboratory, which are the usual
focus in the growth literature.8 Our interpretation of entrepreneurship is thus not unlike the
similarly Schumpeterian interpretation forward by Aghion and Saint Paul (1998) or even that of
Hall (2000) based on entrepreneurship as “reorganization” in a recession. It is similar in e¤ect to
the bene…ts stemming from recessions, emphasized by Caballero and Hammour (1994), though
for di¤erent reasons.
Although our model is rather stylized, it has clear predictions for the interactions of long run
growth and short run ‡uctuations. Firstly, the cycle in our model shows a positive feedback from
both the duration and depth of downturns to the magnitude of succeeding upturns. This feature
is consistent with the evidence of Beaudry and Koop (1993), Pesaran and Potter (1997) and
7This view was shared by Schumpeter (1927) “By innovations I understand such changes of the combinations
of the factors of production as cannot be a¤ected by in…nitesimal steps or variations on the margin. They consist
primarily of changes in methods of production and transportation, or in changes in industrial organization, or in
the production of a new article, or in the opening up of new markets or of new sources of material.”
8“...The function of entrepreneurs is to reform or revolutionize the pattern of production by exploiting an
invention or, more generally, an untried technological possibility for producing a new commodity or producing an
old one in a new way, by opening up a new source of supply of materials or a new outlet for products by reorganizing
industry and so on. ... This function does not essentially consist in either inventing anything or otherwise creating
the conditions which the enterprise exploits. It consists in getting things done” Schumpeter (1950, p. 132).
4Altissimo and Violante (2001). Secondly, the cycles generated by our model exhibit asymmetries
in upturns and downturns, that have some features in common with the evidence of Emery and
Koenig 1992, Sichel 1993 and Balke and Wynne 1995. In particular, business cycles typically
exhibit rapid growth in output at the beginning of the boom, a gradual slowdown and then a
decline which occurs at a fairly constant rate. Thirdly, consistent with the evidence of Ramey and
Ramey (1995), variation in the productivity of entrepreneurship induces a negative relationship
between long run growth and output volatility.
A valuable feature of the model we present here is its parsimony. Apart from a slight gener-
alization of preferences, the model is identical to Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 4). Indeed
one equilibrium mirrors the acyclical growth path that they analyze.9 T h eu l t i m a t ev a l u eo f
theoretical endeavors aiming to merge growth and cycles will be in their ability to provide a
convincing account of the high frequency data. While the model does …t some features of high
frequency cycles well, we do not claim to have done that yet. For example, the boom occurs too
rapidly and the slowdown is too abrupt. However, the model’s simplicity allows it to be used as a
platform for more empirically motivated extensions to follow. We discuss these in the conclusion.
Recently several authors have developed related, non–GPT models of endogenous growth
and cycles. Francois and Shi (1999) modify the Grossman and Helpman (1991) growth model
by allowing exogenous, drastic imitation (as in Shleifer 1986), by introducing a technological
innovation process requiring accumulated inputs through time, and by treating the interest rate as
exogenous.10 That model also inherits Shleifer’s (1986) non-robustness to storage. In Matsuyama
(1999) the clustering of innovations also results from the short–term nature of monopoly rents,
though through a di¤erent channel. In his framework growth arises due to increasing product
variety. Thus the upsurge in growth there arises through drastic innovations that represent wholly
new (though partially substitutable) products, and is driven by a few leading sectors. This again
lends itself more easily to a long cycle interpretation rather than the decentralized growth that
we observe in the high volatility cycle. Freeman, Hong and Peled (1999) develop a model of
cycles featuring a “time to build” component in innovation. As they emphasize, this technology
describes “big” research or infrastructural projects, once again suggesting a long wave application
9Their analysis rules out the possibility of a cycle with su¢ciently many sectors: though speci…c sectors could
experience “lumpy growth”, these e¤ects wash out in the aggregate.
10The exogeneity of the interest rate and choice of technology in Francois and Shi (1999) are related. A non-
memoryless research technology ensures labour allocations to R&D through the length of the cycle. In the present
paper, this is achieved endogenously by adjustment in the endogenous interest rate. We show that movements in
the interest rate play a crucial role in supporting the cycle.
5of the cycle. However, the resulting dynamics of the economy are, at least super…cially similar to
those reported here.
The present paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the economy’s fundamentals and
de…nes a general equilibrium, and, in Section 3, we show that one equilibrium of the model is an
acyclical growth path that is qualitatively identical to that studied by Grossman and Helpman
(1991). Section 4 presents the main results of the paper. We posit a cycle and derive the
equilibrium behavior of households, …rms and entrepreneurs that would be consistent with such
a cycle. We then derive the su¢cient conditions required for a unique cyclical equilibrium to
exist, and show that the cyclical equilibrium is stable. Section 5 examines the implications of our
equilibrium growth process for the endogenous relationship between long–run growth and short–
run volatility, and for the impacts of a counter–cyclical …scal policy. We also compare the long run
growth and welfare in the acyclical and cyclical equilibria. In our conclusion, we discuss possible
extensions of the model that would help to match business cycle facts more closely. Technical
details of proofs and derivations are relegated to the appendix.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Assumptions
Time is continuous and indexed by t. We consider a closed economy with no government sector.







where ½ denotes the rate of time preference and we assume that ¾ 2 (0;1).E a c h h o u s e h o l d







where w(t) denotes wage income, B(t) denotes the household’s stock of assets at time t and R(t)
denotes the discount factor from time zero to t.
Final output is produced by competitive …rms according to a Cobb-Douglas production func-







6Final output is storable (at an arbitrarily small cost), but cannot be converted back into an input
for use in production. We let pi denote the price of intermediate i.
Output of intermediate i depends upon the state of technology in sector i; Ai (t); and the
labor resources devoted to production, li; in a linear manner:
ks
i(t)=Ai(t)li(t): (4)
Labor receives the equilibrium wage w(t). There is no imitation, so the dominant entrepreneur in
each sector undertakes all production and earns monopoly pro…ts by limit pricing until displaced
by a higher productivity rival. We assume that intermediates are completely used up in produc-
tion, but can be produced and stored for use at a later date. Incumbent intermediate producers
must therefore decide whether to sell now, or store and sell later.
Competitive entrepreneurs in each sector attempt to …nd ongoing marginal improvements
in productivity by diverting labor e¤ort away from production and towards innovation.11 They
…nance their activities by selling equity shares to households. The probability of an entrepreneurial
success in instant t is ±xi(t); where ± is a parameter, and xi is the labor e¤ort allocated to
entrepreneurship in sector i. At any point in time, entrepreneurs decide whether or not to
allocate labor e¤ort to innovation, and if they do so, how much. The aggregate labour e¤ort
allocated to entrepreneurship is given by X(t)=
R 1
0 xi(t)dt.
New innovations dominate old ones by a factor e°. Entrepreneurs with innovations, must
choose whether or not to implement their innovation immediately or delay implementation until a
later date. Once they implement, the knowledge associated with the innovation becomes publicly
available, and can be built upon by rival entrepreneurs. However, prior to implementation, the
knowledge is privately held by the entrepreneur. We let the indicator function Zi(t) take on the
value 1 if there exists a successful innovation in sector i which has not yet been implemented, and
0 otherwise. The set of periods in which innovations are implemented in sector i is denoted by
­i.W el e tV I
i (t) denote the expected present value of pro…ts from implementing an innovation at
time t,a n dV D
i (t) denote that of delaying implementation from time t until the most pro…table
time in future.
Finally, we assume the existence of arbitrageurs who instantaneously trade assets to erode
any pro…t opportunities. There are three potential assets in our economy: claims to the pro…ts
11This process can equivalently be thought of as a search for product improvements, process improvements,
organizational advances or anything else in the form of new knowledge which creates a productive advance over
the existing state of the art.
7of intermediate …rms, stored intermediate output and stored …nal output. As we shall see, in all
of the equilibria discussed below, only claims to the pro…ts of intermediate …rms will be traded
— intermediate and …nal output are never stored. However, the potential for stored output to
be traded imposes restrictions on the possible equilibria that can emerge.
In summary, our model is formally identical to that developed by Grossman and Helpman
(1991), but with an elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1=¾, that exceeds unity. However,
we have expanded the set of possible strategies by divorcing the realization of innovations from
the decision to implement them (as in Shleifer, 1986) and by allowing intermediate output to be
potentially storable.
2.2 De…nition of Equilibrium
Given an initial stock of implemented innovations represented by a cross–sectoral distribution of
productivities fAi(0)g1
i=0 and an initial distribution of unimplemented innovations, fZi(0)g1
i=0,
an equilibrium for this economy satis…es the following conditions:
² Households allocate consumption over time to maximize (1) subject (2). The …rst–order con-
ditions of the household’s optimization require that
c(t)¾ = c(s)¾eR(t)¡R(s)¡½(t¡s) 8 t;s; (5)
and that the transversality condition holds
lim
s!1e¡R(s)B(s)=0 (6)
² Final goods producers choose intermediates to maximize pro…ts. The derived demand for











and the instantaneous pro…t earned is
¼i(t)=( 1¡ e¡°)y(t): (9)
Note crucially that …rm pro…ts are proportional the aggregate demand.
8² Labour market clearing:
Z 1
0
li(t)di + X(t)=1 (10)
Labour market equilibrium also implies
w(t)(1 ¡ X(t)) = e¡°y(t) (11)
² Free entry into arbitrage. For all assets that are held in strictly positive amounts by households,
the rate of return between time t and time s must equal
R(s)¡R(t)
s¡t .
² There is free entry into innovation. Entrepreneurs select the sector in which they innovate so
as to maximize the expected present value of the innovation. Also
±max[V D
i (t);VI
i (t)] · w(t), xi(t) ¸ 0 with at least one equality (12)
² In periods where there is implementation, entrepreneurs with innovations must prefer to imple-
ment rather that delay until a later date
V I
i (t) ¸ V D
i (t) 8 t 2 ­i (13)
² In periods where there is no implementation, either there must be no innovations available to
implement, or entrepreneurs with innovations must prefer to delay rather than implement:
Either Zi(t)=0 , (14)
or if Zi(t)=1 ;V I
i (t) · V D
i (t) 8 t= 2 ­i:
In what follows we characterize two types of equilibria that satisfy these conditions. The …rst
mirrors the familiar acyclical growth path analyzed by Grossman and Helpman (1991). However,
the second is a growth path featuring regular downturns and upsurges in economic activity.
3 The Acyclical Equilibrium
Along an acyclical growth path, the rate of innovation is constant and output grows at a constant
rate. The key feature of this equilibrium is that innovation occurs every period and implementa-
tion occurs immediately, so that Zi(t)=08 i;t. Although, this growth path is well understood,
it is useful to brie‡y outline the equilibrium and, in particular, to see why implementation of
innovations is never delayed.
9In the acyclical equilibrium, consumption is a continuous function of time and its growth rate







where r(t)= _ R denotes the instantaneous interest rate. Since all innovations are implemented










Since, innovation occurs in every period, free entry into R&D implies that
±V(t)=w(t): (18)
Putting these conditions together yields
Proposition 1 : If







then there exists an acyclical equilibrium with a constant growth rate given by
ga =
[±(1 ¡ e¡°) ¡ ½e¡°]°
1 ¡ ° (1 ¡ ¾)e¡° : (20)
Along this equilibrium growth path the …rst inequality in (19) implies that r(t) >g a(t) at
every moment.12 Along a balanced growth path, this condition must hold for the transversality
condition to be satis…ed and hence for utility to be bounded. However, this condition also
ensures both that no output is stored, and that the implementation of any innovation is never
delayed. The return on storage is the growth in the price of the intermediate good in non–
i n n o v a t i n gs e c t o r s ,w h i c hi nt u r ne q u a l sga(t).T h u s , s i n c e r(t) >g a(t), it never pays to store
the intermediate.13 That delay is never optimal in this equilibrium can be seen by considering
the extreme case where obsolescence is certain after implementation. In this case the gain from
12The second condition in Proposition 1 ensures that entrepreneurs are su¢ciently pro…table to warrant invest-
ment, when ¾<1. Otherwise growth would be zero.
13Obviously, since r>0; …nal output is never stored either.
10delay is the growth in pro…ts equal to ga(t). However, since this gain is discounted at the rate
r(t), immediate implementation is always optimal. If obsolescence is not certain, the relative gain
from immediate implementation is even greater.
4 The Cyclical Equilibrium
In this section we posit a cyclical growth path along which innovations are implemented in clusters
rather than in a smooth fashion. We derive the optimal behavior of agents in such a cyclical
equilibrium and the evolution of the key variables under market clearing. We derive su¢cient
conditions for the existence of such a cyclical equilibrium and show that market clearing implies
a unique positive cycle length and long run growth rate.
Suppose that the implementation of entrepreneurial innovations occurs at discrete intervals.
An implementation period is denoted by Tº where v 2f 1;2;:::;1g, and we adopt the conven-
tion that the vth cycle starts in period Tv¡1 and ends in period Tº. The evolution of output
during a typical cycle between implementation is depicted in Figure 1. A boom occurs when ac-
cumulated innovations are implemented at Tv¡1. After that there is an interval during which no
entrepreneurial e¤ort is devoted to improvement of existing technologies and consequently where
all resources are used in production. During this interval, no new innovations are implemented
so that growth slows to zero. At some time TE
v innovation commences again, but successful en-
trepreneurs withhold implementation until time Tv: Entrepreneurial activity occurs throughout
the interval [TE
v ;T v] and causes a decline in the economy’s production, as resources are diverted
away from production towards the search for improvements. At Tv all successful entrepreneurs
implement, and the (v +1 ) th cycle starts with a boom.
INSERT FIGURE 1
Over intervals during which the discount factor does not jump, consumption is allocated as
described by (15). However, as we will demonstrate here, along the cyclical growth path, the
discount rate jumps at the boom, so that consumption exhibits a discontinuity during imple-
mentation periods.14 We therefore characterize the optimal evolution of consumption from the
14Discontinuities in consumption can only be ruled out if the discount factor evolves smoothly. Note further that














= R(Tv) ¡ R(Tv¡1) ¡ ½(Tv ¡ Tv¡1): (21)
where the 0 subscript is used to denote values of variables the instant after the implementation
boom. Note that a su¢cient condition for the boundedness of the consumer’s optimization
problem is that ln
c0(Tv)










In our analysis below, it is convenient to de…ne the discount factor that will be used to discount
from some time t during the cycle to the beginning of the next cycle. This discount factor is given
by





Let Pi(s) denote the probability that, since time Tv, no entrepreneurial success has been made
in sector i by time s. It follows that the probability of there being no innovation by time Tv+1
conditional on there having been none by time t,i sg i v e nb yPi(Tv+1)=Pi(t): Hence, the value of
an incumbent …rm in a sector where no innovation has occurred by time t during the vth cycle













The …rst term here represents the discounted pro…t stream that accrues to the entrepreneur with
certainty during the current cycle, and the second term is the expected discounted value of being
an incumbent thereafter.
In the acyclical equilibrium, the role of secrecy is not relevant because innovators would
always prefer to implement even if it were possible that, by delaying, they could protect their
knowledge. Since simultaneous innovation can only occur with a second order probability in
that equilibrium, it is assumed away. In the cyclical equilibrium considered here, secrecy (i.e.
protecting the knowledge embodied in a new innovation by delaying implementation) can be
a valuable option.15 Innovations are withheld until a common implementation time, so that
15As Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) document, delaying implementation to protect knowledge is a widely
followed practice in reality.
12simultaneous implementation is a possibility. However, as the following Lemma demonstrates,
such duplications do not arise in the cycling equilibrium:
Lemma 1 In a cyclical equilibrium, successful entrepreneurs can credibly signal a success im-
mediately and all research in their sector will stop until the next round of implementation.
If an entrepreneur’s announcement is credible, other entrepreneurs will exert their e¤orts in
sectors where they have a better chance of becoming the dominant entrepreneur. One might
imagine that unsuccessful entrepreneurs would have an incentive to mimic successful ones by
falsely announcing success to deter others from entering the sector. However, in fact, there is no
advantage to this strategy relative to the alternative of allocating e¤ort to the sector until, with
some probability, another entrepreneur is successful, and then switching to another sector.16 This
result stems from the memoryless nature of the Poisson process governing innovation — there is
no advantage to having previously exerted e¤ort in any given sector. An alternative assumption
that will imply the same shutting down of innovation after a success, is that the allocation of
entrepreneurial e¤ort is directly observable so that success can be inferred directly.
In the cyclical equilibrium, entrepreneurs have conjectures that ensure no more allocation
of entrepreneurship to a sector once a signal of success has been received, until after the next









Since no implementation occurs during the cycle, the entrepreneur is assured of incumbency until
at least Tv+1. Incumbency beyond that time depends on the probability that there has not been
another successful innovation in that sector up until then.17 This depends on the amount of
entrepreneurship conducted in that sector within the cycle. The symmetry of sectors implies that
innovative e¤ort is allocated evenly over all sectors that have not yet experienced an innovation
16Readers concerned with the robustness of the equilibrium should note that, if we assume an arbitrarily small
but positive signalling cost, the equilibrium would involve strictly dominant strategies.
17A signal of further entrepreneurial success submitted by an incumbent is not credible in equilibrium. This is
for the standard reason that innovation in other sectors is always more pro…table than innovation in one’s own, so
that an incumbent’s success signals do not dissuade innovation. Note also that though there is no patent protection
and hence the possibility of imitation, this is weakly dominated given the Bertrand interaction between imitators
and incumbents. With arbitrarily small costs to imitation this strategy is strictly dominated by non-imitation.










where ~ xi(¿) denotes the quantity of labor that would be allocated to entrepreneurship if no
innovation had been discovered prior to time ¿ in sector i; recalling that TE
v denotes the time at
which entrepreneurship re-commences within the cycle. The amount of entrepreneurship varies
over the cycle. However at the beginning of each cycle all industries are symmetric with respect
to this probability: Pi(Tv)=P(Tv) 8i.
4.2 Within–cycle dynamics
Within a cycle, t 2 [Tv¡1;T v], the state of technology in use is unchanging. A critical variable
is the amount of labor devoted to entrepreneurship, the opportunity cost of which is production.
In order to determine this, we …rst characterize wages paid to labour in production.







T h ew a g ei sc o m p l e t e l yp i n n e dd o w nb yt h et e c h n o l o g yg i v e nc o m p e t i t i o nb e t w e e nt h ep r o d u c i n g
…rms in attempting to hire labour. This competition does not drive the wage up to labor’s
marginal product because …rms earn monopolistic rents in their sectors. However, it does ensure
that labor bene…ts proportionately from productivity advancements. We denote the improvement





[lnAi(Tv) ¡ lnAi(Tv¡1)]di (28)
Since wages are determined by the level of technology in use, and since this does not change
within the cycle, wages are constant within the cycle.
Following an implementation boom, the economy passes through two distinct phases:
The Slowdown:
As a result of the boom, wages rise rapidly. Since the next implementation boom is some time
away, the present value of engaging in innovation falls below the wage, ±V D(t) <w (t). During
14this phase, no labour is allocated to entrepreneurship and no new innovations come on line. Since





With zero growth, the demand side of the economy dictates that the interest rate just equal the
discount rate,
r(t)=¾g(t)+½ = ½: (30)
Since the economy is closed and there is no incentive to store either intermediate or …nal output
when r(t) ¸ 0, it must be the case that:
c(t)=y(t): (31)
During the slowdown, the expected value of entrepreneurship, ±V D(t),n e e dn o tb ee q u a l
across periods — it can be changing provided that entrepreneurship continues to be dominated by
production. In fact, since the interest rate is positive over this phase, the value of entrepreneurship
is necessarily growing at the rate ½. Since the wage is constant during the cycle, ±V D(t),m u s t
eventually equal w(t). At this point, the entrepreneurship commences. The following Lemma
demonstrates that it does so smoothly:
Lemma 3 At time TE







Proof: : See Appendix.
The Downturn:
For positive entrepreneurship to occur under free entry, it must be that wv = ±V D(t).S i n c e
the wage is constant throughout the cycle, the value of entrepreneurship, ±V D(t),m u s ta l s ob e
constant during this phase. Since the time until implementation for a successful entrepreneur
is falling and there is no stream of pro…ts because implementation is delayed, the instantaneous








15With a positive discount rate, ½>0, a zero interest rate implies that consumption must be
declining. Since the economy is closed, it follows once again that because there is no incentive to








This occurs during the downturn because labour ‡ows out of production and into entrepreneurship
(knowledge capital is being built). Using (11), (33) and the fact that X(TE
v )=0 , yields the





The proportion of sectors that have not yet experienced an entrepreneurial success by time
t 2 (TE










Recalling that labor is only devoted to entrepreneurship in sectors which have not innovated since





Di¤erentiating (35), and substituting in (36), we thus obtain the aggregate rate of entrepreneurial
success,
_ P(t)=¡±x(t)P(t)=¡±X(t): (37)
Observe that although the rate of decline in the proportion of sectors that have not yet innovated,
P(t), is proportional to the amount of entrepreneurship in each sector, the level reductions in P
are proportional to the aggregate amount of entrepreneurship. This re‡ects the fact that as new
innovations arise, the aggregate labor e¤ort is allocated across fewer and fewer sectors. It follows
that if the cycle is su¢ciently long it is possible that all sectors will innovate.
The dynamic movement of variables implied by our hypothesized cycle is sketched in Figure
1. The resulting allocation of labor to entrepreneurship (34) determines the size of the output
boom at the end of the cycle. Denote the interval over which there is positive entrepreneurship
by
¢E
v = Tv ¡ TE
v : (38)
Then we have:
18Although r =0 , strict preference for zero storage results from arbitrarily small storage costs.
16Proposition 2 In an equilibrium where there is positive entrepreneurship only over the interval
(TE











Equation (39) tells us how the size of the productivity boom depends positively on the amount of
time the economy is in the entrepreneurship phase, ¢E
v . The amount of innovation in that phase
is determined by the movements in the interest rate, so once the length of the entrepreneurship
phase is known, the growth rate over the cycle is pinned down. The size of the boom is convex
in ¢E
v , re‡ecting the fact that as the boom approaches, the labor allocated towards innovation is
increasing. This also implies that the boom size is increasing in the depth of the downturn, since
from (34) the longer the downturn the greater the allocation of entrepreneurial e¤ort and hence
the larger the decline in output. This is a feature which the model here shares with GPT type
Schumpeterian models of the cycle, such as described in Aghion and Saint Paul (1998) and which
has received considerable empirical support (see Beaudry and Koop 1993, Pesaran and Potter
1997, and Altissimo and Violante 2001). Note that the size of the boom does not depend directly
on the cycle length Tv ¡ Tv¡1. That is, the growth spur from entrepreneurship depends only on
the amount of time that entrepreneurial e¤ort was exerted, and not the amount of time between
implementations of entrepreneurial success.
4.3 Market Clearing During the Boom
For an entrepreneur who is holding an innovation, V I(t) is the value of implementing immediately.




Just prior to the boom, when the probability of displacement is negligible, the value of imple-
menting immediately must equal that of delaying until the boom:
±V I(Tv)=±V D(Tv)=wv: (41)
From (40), the return to innovation at the boom is the value of immediate (rather than delayed)
incumbency. It follows that free entry into entrepreneurship at the boom requires that
±V I
0 (Tv) · wv+1 (42)
17The opportunity cost to …nancing entrepreneurship is the rate of return on shares in incumbent
…rms in sectors where no innovation has occurred. Just prior to the boom, this is given by the








Note that since the short–term interest rate is zero over this phase, ¯(t)=¯(Tv), 8 t 2 (TE
v ;T v).







Free entry into innovation ensures that ¯(Tv) > ¡v cannot obtain in equilibrium.
Provided that ¯(t) > 0, households will never choose to store …nal output from within a cycle
to the beginning of the next either because it is dominated by the long–run rate of return on
claims to future pro…ts. However, unlike …nal output, the return on stored intermediate output in
sectors with no innovations, is strictly positive because of the increase in its price that occurs as
a result of the boom. Even though there is a risk that the intermediate becomes obsolete at the
boom, if the anticipated price increase is su¢ciently large, households may choose to purchase
claims to intermediate output rather than claims to …rm pro…ts.19
If innovative activities are to be …nanced at time t; it cannot be the case that households are
strictly better o¤ buying claims to stored intermediate goods. There are two types of storage
that could arise, but the return to each is the same. In sectors with unimplemented innovations,
entrepreneurs who hold innovations have the option of implementing immediately but not actually
selling until the boom. The best way to do so is to hire labour and produce an instant prior to
the boom; producing any earlier will not be any cheaper and will yield a higher probability of
displacement. Also, the best time to sell is an instant after the boom, since after the boom
interest rates are positive and demand is ‡at. Since the revenue is the same, the di¤erence
between producing an instant before the boom and an instant after the boom, is that the former
involves the current wage and the latter involves the higher future wage. Thus, the return on
19Note that incumbent entrepreneurs will not be able to use storage to dissuade further innovation in their sector.
Since returns to innovation are identical across sectors, one may suppose that incumbents have an incentive to store
intermediate production and threaten to use it to undercut any future innovator in their sector. If credible, such
a threat would lead outside entrepreneurs to search for innovations in other sectors. However, such a threat is
not credible. If faced with an innovator holding a productive advantage that will be implemented at time T; an
incumbent would always have incentive to sell stockpiled intermediates before time T since by doing so they would
obtain a higher price than by delaying and selling it in competition with the new innovator.
18claims to stored intermediates is logwv+1=wv =¡ v: In sectors with no innovation, incumbent
…rms could sell such claims, use them to …nance greater current production and then store the
good to sell at the beginning of the next boom when the price is higher. In this case, since the
cost of production is the same whether the good is stored or not, the rate of return on claims to
stored intermediates in sector i is logpi;v+1 =pi;v =¡ v.
It follows that the long run rate of return on claims to …rm pro…ts an instant prior to the
boom must satisfy
¯(Tv) ¸ ¡v (45)
Free–entry into arbitrage ensures that ¯(Tv) < ¡v cannot obtain in equilibrium. Because there
is a risk of obsolescence, this condition implies that at any time prior to the boom the expected
rate of return on claims to stored intermediates is strictly less than ¯(t).
Combining this (44) and (45) yields the following implication of market clearing during the
boom for the long–run growth path:






Since the short term interest rate during the downturn is zero, asset market clearing requires that
the long term interest rate at the end of the downturn is equal to its value at the beginning. The
value at the end must equal the size of the productivity boom in equilibrium; the value at the
beginning re‡ects the size of the future boom and the time until it occurs. It follows that asset
market–clearing yields a unique relationship between the length of the downturn and the size of
the subsequent productivity boom.
INSERT FIGURE 2
Figure 2 depicts the two conditions (39) and (46) graphically. As can be seen, combining the
two conditions yields a unique (non–zero) equilibrium pair (¡;¢E) that is consistent with the
within–cycle dynamics and the asset market clearing condition. Substituting out ¡ from (39)


















A’Note that although we did not impose any stationarity on the cycles, the equilibrium conditions
imply stationarity of the size of the boom and the length of the downturn. For a unique positive
value of ¢E that satis…es this condition to exist it is su¢cient that
½
±°(1¡¾) < 1:
4.4 Optimal Entrepreneurial Behavior
It has thus far been assumed that entrepreneurs are willing to follow the innovation and imple-
mentation sequence hypothesized in the cycle. Firstly, the equilibrium conditions that we have
considered so far e¤ectively assume that entrepreneurs who plan to delay implementation until
the boom, are willing to just start engaging in innovative activities at exactly TE
v . However,
the willingness of entrepreneurs do this depends crucially on the expected value of monopoly
rents resulting from innovation, relative to the current labour costs. This is a forward looking
condition: given ¡ and ¢E, the present value of these rents depend crucially on the length of the
subsequent cycle, Tv+1 ¡ Tv.
Since Lemma 3 implies that entrepreneurship starts smoothly at TE






Since the increase in the wage across cycles re‡ects only the improvement in productivity:
wv+1 = e¡wv, and since from the asset market clearing conditions, we know that ¯(TE
v )=¡ ,i t
immediately follows that the increase in the present value of monopoly pro…ts from the begin-





Equation (49) implies that given some initial implementation period and stationary values of ¡
and ¢E, the next implementation periods is determined. Notice, once again that this stationarity
is not imposed, but is an implication of the equilibrium conditions. Letting ¢v = Tv ¡ Tv¡1,w e
therefore have the following result:
Proposition 4 Given the boom size, ¡, and the length of the entrepreneurial innovation phase,
¢E, there exists a unique cycle length, ¢, such that entrepreneurs are just willing to commence
innovation, ¢E periods prior to the boom.


















Note that for the equilibrium value of ¢ to strictly exceed ¢E (which it must) requires that
½
±°(1¡¾) > 1 ¡ e¡°:
In addition, the equilibrium conditions (12), (13) and (14) on entrepreneurial behavior also
impose the following requirements on our hypothesized cycle:
² Successful entrepreneurs at time t = Tv, must prefer to implement immediately, rather than




² Entrepreneurs who successfully innovate during the downturn must prefer to wait until the
beginning of the next cycle rather than implement earlier:
V I(t) <VD(t) 8 t 2 (TE
v ;T v) (52)
² No entrepreneur wants to innovate during the slowdown of the cycle. Since in this phase of the
cycle ±V D(t) <w (t), this condition requires that
±V I(t) <w (t) 8 t 2 (0;TE
v ) (53)
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of the relevant value functions in the cyclical equilibrium, and
the productivity adjusted wage wv=±. At the beginning of the cycle wv = ±V I(Tv) >± VD(Tv).
Since the wage is constant, ±V D(t) grows and ±V I(t) declines during the …rst phase of the cycle,
this condition implies that ±V D(t) and ±V I(t) must intersect before ±V D(t) reaches w(t).I t
follows that when entrepreneurship starts, it is optimal to delay implementation, V D(TE
v ) >
V I(TE
v ). Over time, during the entrepreneurship phase, the probability of not being displaced
at the boom if you implement early declines so that V I(t) rises over time. Eventually, an instant
prior to the boom, V I(Tv+1)=V D(Tv+1), but until that point it continues to be optimal to delay.
At the boom, the value of immediate implementation rises by more than the value of delay, so
that all existing innovations are implemented. However, since the wage increases by at least as
much as V I(t), entrepreneurship ceases and the cycle begins again.20
INSERT FIGURE 3























and if the values of (¢E;¢;¡) solving (39), (46) and (50), are such that ¡ <° ,t h e nt h e r ee x i s t s
a unique cyclical equilibrium growth path.
The …rst inequality in (54) is su¢cient to ensure that the long run interest rate exceeds the
long run growth rate as in (22), so that the transversality condition is satis…ed. It also implies
that during the cycle the short–run interest rate always exceeds the short–run growth rate. This
implies that at the beginning of a cycle, implementation is never delayed, because any gain in
pro…ts from delay is less the rate at which it is discounted. However, during the downturn, this
condition also implies that implementation is delayed until the next boom. To understand this,
note that the boom is the only time during the cycle at which the increment in output exceeds
the increment in the discount factor. Although, the increment in productivity, ¡, exactly equals
the increment in the discount factor, ¯, the reallocation of labour resources back into production
implies that output increases by more than the increment in productivity. Thus, the increase in
pro…ts at the boom exceeds the rate at which they are discounted. If the probability of being
displaced is su¢ciently low (which it will be towards the end of the cycle), there is an incentive
to delay implementation.
The second inequality in (54) is necessary for there to exist a downturn length ¢E,s u c h
that the resulting boom is consistent with asset market equilibrium. It is also su¢cient to
ensure that value of immediate implementation declines monotonically during the slowdown. It
is straightforward to show that the two inequalities in (54) are also su¢cient for the existence
of the acyclical equilibrium, but not vice versa. However, provided ° is small, the conditions for
the cyclical equilibrium are not much more demanding. The additional requirement that ¡ <° ,
ensures that not all sectors innovate during the cycle.
Entrepreneurship in our cycle increases through the downturn when its opportunity cost is low.
In this sense, the downturn of our cycle creates a bene…cial e¤ect for the economy, as in Caballero
aggregate consumption data are typically smaller than 1. However, as Beaudry and van Wincoop (1996) document,
these estimates are biased towards zero, and that when one uses more disaggregate data, values above 1 cannot be
rejected.
22and Hammour (1995) where the downturn cleans out ine¢cient …rms. The bene…ts of downturns
in our model are very di¤erent, however, as they are intimately linked to the economy’s growth
process. The actions of entrepreneurs here also resemble the “reorganization” activity emphasized
by Hall (2000) in his model of the cycle. Though entrepreneurial activity through the cycle is
di¢cult to measure, it is likely to be positively correlated with other, more measurable, forms
of e¤ort re-allocation through the cycle. In this regard it is interesting to note that, consistent
with our model, US post-secondary educational investments are found to be counter-cyclical, see
Dellas and Sakellaris (1997). This counter-cyclicality of enrolments is also found in a broader
group of OECD countries by Sakellaris and Spilimbergo (2000).
4.6 Stability
4.6.1 Stability of the Instantaneous equilibrium
We …rst assess the stability of the instantaneous equilibrium is in response to small perturbations
in the behavior of agents. That is, as a result of errors made by a small measure of agents, will
ensuing market prices reinforce those errors and thereby signal to other agents optimal behavior
which is further inconsistent with equilibrium behavior? In every instant of the cycle, labor
chooses between entrepreneurship and production, entrepreneurs choose between implementing
today or delaying until tomorrow, and incumbents must decide whether to sell now or store. We
now consider the stability of the instantaneous equilibrium with respect to each of these decisions
in turn:
Stability in the labour market: Suppose …rst that too few agents engage in entrepreneur-
ship than is implied by our equilibrium. In the no entrepreneurship phase, production strictly
dominates entrepreneurial e¤ort, w(t) >±max[V D(t);VI(t)]. Small errors of this kind, will thus
not a¤ect others’ optimal behavior. The same is not true, however, in the positive entrepreneur-
ship phase, when w(t)=±V D(t). Consider a small perturbation of the equilibrium such that
at t, insu¢cient labor ‡ows into entrepreneurship. Then from (33) the short–run growth rate
is given by g(t)=¡
½
¾ + ". It follows from (15) that r(t) > 0; so that
_ V D(t)
V D(t) > 0,w h i c h ,s i n c e
_ w(t)
w(t) =0 ; implies more labour will be allocated to entrepreneurship. Thus, since fewer than the
equilibrium number of individuals ‡owing into entrepreneurship results in greater incentives for
entrepreneurship, the relationship is stable.
23Stability of entrepreneurial delay: Suppose now that some measure of entrepreneurs er-
roneously implement their innovations immediately during the downturn rather than delaying.
In this phase w(t)=±V D (t) >± V I (t): Such unanticipated implementation leaves V D (t) un-
changed because the technology in use at the time of the boom is unchanged; some of it has just
been implemented earlier. However, it raises V I (t) due to the unexpected increasing in produc-
tivity of technology ¿ 2 [t;Tv]: Since V D (¿) is discretely bigger than V I (¿) over this phase, a
small deviation from the equilibrium has no e¤ect on incentives to delay. This is even true the
instant before implementation, since lim¿!Tv V D (¿)¡V I (¿)=0 .21 This limit still converges fol-
lowing a surprise implementation, since the two terms are equivalent at Tv: Thus, though earlier
implementation raises V I relative to V D; it cannot alter the relative ranking of the two.
Stability of No–Storage: Long–run asset market clearing in a cyclical equilibrium requires
that the return on claims to …rm pro…ts equals the return to storage in the last instant of the
cycle, ¯(t)=¡ . Suppose that someone mistakenly o¤ers to …nance the production of extra
intermediate output for storage, by buying claims to the stored output. This act will e¤ectively
draw some labour e¤ort out of entrepreneurship causing the anticipated value of ¡ to decline so
that ¯(t) > ¡. In the next instant the buyer will be better o¤ selling the intermediate output
and using the proceeds to …nance entrepreneurs, which will restore the equilibrium.
4.6.2 Dynamic Stability
A second notion of stability relates to the dynamic convergence of the economy to its long–run
growth path. Like the acyclical growth path, the cyclical equilibrium is “jump stable”. As our




that is consistent with equilibrium.




triple can hold, even in the short run, without violating the equilibrium conditions.
In principle, the economy could jump to the acyclical equilibrium if expectations regarding which
equilibrium the economy is in were to change in a coordinated way. However, it should be
emphasized that the cycles generated by our model are not the result of exogenous shifts in
expectations, as in Evans, Honkapohja and Romer (1998) for example. In Section 5, we discuss in





are unique, strictly speaking there are multiple cyclical equilibria
21To see this compute the limit in equation (92) in the appendix.
24exhibiting identical cyclical properties and long run growth. The reason is that the length of the
…rst cycle ¢0 is indeterminate on the interval [¢E;¢].
5 Implications for Long–Run Growth and Volatility
In this section we compare the long–run growth rates in the cycling and acyclical economies and
discuss some of the implications of the equilibrium that we have characterized for the impact of
parameter and policy changes on cycles, growth and the relationship between them.
5.1 Growth and welfare in cyclical and acyclical economies
Let the average growth rate in the cycling equilibrium be denoted
gc =¡ =¢; (55)
and recall the acyclical equilibrium growth, ga g i v e ni n( 2 0 ) .T h e nw eh a v e
Proposition 6 The long run growth rate in the cyclical equilibrium gc exceeds that in the acyclical
equilibrium, ga.
The cycling steady state yields higher average growth because all entrepreneurship occurs in
t h ed o w n t u r nw h e ng r o w t hi sn e g a t i v ea n dt h ei n t e r e s tr a t ei sl o wr e l a t i v et ot h ee c o n o m y ’ sl o n g
run average. Thus compared with the acyclical economy where the interest rate is constant, the
same expected ‡ow of pro…ts for the same expected length of incumbency has higher value in the
cycling economy, thereby inducing more entrepreneurship and higher growth.
Although the long–run growth rate is higher in the cyclical equilibrium, the same is not true
of welfare. Consider two economies that start with an identical stock of implemented technologies
and zero unimplemented innovations. Suppose one of the economies is in a cyclical equilibrium
at the beginning of a cycle and the other is in an acyclical equilibrium. There are three key
di¤erences that determine relative welfare in the two economies: (1) the long–run growth rate
in the cyclical economy is higher, (2) the initial consumption in the cyclical economy is higher
because some labor is allocated to production in the acyclical economy, whereas none is during
this phase of the cyclical equilibrium, and (3) until the next boom, the short–run growth rate in
25the cyclical economy is zero or negative, whereas it is positive in the acyclical one. As we illustrate
below, this last factor tends to dominate so that welfare is lower in the cyclical economy.22
Table 1 compares the welfare consequences of moving from the cyclical to the acyclical equilib-
rium under a broad range of parameters that are consistent with the model’s existence conditions.
It turns out that the welfare bene…ts of removing cycles are relatively large, around 3%. The
reason for this is that the growth rate di¤erences are relatively small and the labor allocated
to entrepreneurship in the acyclical economy is also small, so that the third e¤ect on welfare,
discussed above, swamps the other two. Note, however, that welfare in the cycling economy is
sensitive to the point in the cycle where welfare is computed. Since technology is …xed and there






w e l f a r ei sc o m p u t e da tt h ee n do fas l o w d o w n ,TE
v , as opposed to at its start, Tv¡1,t h e… r s tb o o m
arrives earlier and hence welfare is higher.
Growth Rate Growth Rate Welfare ¢
Cycles No-cycles Increase
Benchmark Parameters
° = :12 ½ = :025 ¾ = :25 ± =2 2.666% 2.660% 2.98% 3.83
° = :115 2.440% 2.429% 2.82% 4.4
° = :125 2.910% 2.902% 3.13% 3.4
½ = :022 2.704% 2.695% 3.02% 3.31
½ = :028 2.640% 2.625% 2.94% 4.4
¾ = :2 2.681% 2.676% 2.39% 2.67
¾ = :27 2.664% 2.654% 3.21% 4.4
± =2 :4 3.258% 3.250% 3.03% 2.58
± =1 :8 2.382% 2.365% 2.942% 4.85
Table 1: Growth and Welfare Di¤erences across equilibria
5.2 Impact of Entrepreneurial Productivity
Consider the impact of an increase in entrepreneurial productivity ± on the cyclical growth path.23
One variable of particular interest, aside from the long–run growth rate, is the economy’s volatility.
















(t ¡ (¢ ¡ ¢E)) ¡ gct
¸2
dt: (56)
22Lucas (1987) performs a related comparison but without an underlying structural model of the economy. He
simply computes the welfare improvement from eradicating the cycle while maintaining the same average growth
rate and …nds this welfare gain to be extremely small.
23In our model human capital is normalized to unity. However, in a more general set up, varying the amount of
human capital would be equivalent to varying ±.
26Proposition 7 An increase in ± results in shorter cycles, smaller booms, shallower recessions
and, hence, lower volatility.
To understand these results …rst consider Figure 2. For a given cycle length and downturn
length (¢;¢E), an increase in ± causes the size of the boom to be larger because entrepreneurship
is now more productive. This is illustrated by the outward shift in OA to OA’. However, now the
economy would be to the right of OB, so that the asset market is out of equilibrium, with ¯<¡
just prior to the boom, so that there is an incentive to store. Arbitrageurs would be willing to
o¤er incumbents and entrepreneurs incentives to produce more intermediate output than needed
to supply current demand. In particular, entrepreneurs with unimplemented innovations would
respond by bringing production forward slightly from the boom. But if all entrepreneurs do this,
the boom would actually occur earlier and the incentive to store would disappear. Applying
this argument recursively, one can see that the length of the downturn (and hence the entire)
cycle would fall until it is just short enough to ensure that for the (smaller) size of the boom
that results, the incentive to produce early and store has been removed (i.e. ¯ =¡just prior
to the boom). Thus, as noted in the proposition, the cycle length, recession length and boom
size, would all fall. Although the adjustment process for this economy is simply a jump to the
new equilibrium, forcing more gradual adjustment by altering the model’s dynamics would yield
a similar outcome.24
The implication for long run growth, gc = ¡
¢; depends on how much ¡ falls relative to ¢.I t
turns out, however, that deriving the e¤ect of changes in ± on the growth rate is not analytically
straightforward. Numerical simulations suggest that increasing ± increases the average growth
rate, as one would expect. In fact, after extensive simulations we have not been able to …nd a
single exception to this. Essentially, an increase in ± causes the length of the downturn to fall
proportionately less than the entire cycle length. Combining this with the impacts on volatility
implies that:
Across economies with di¤erent values of ±, there exists a negative relationship between long–run
growth and volatility.
24Although we do not explicitly allow this here, under more gradual adjustment (say if ¢
E were initially unable
to change) the higher value of ¡ provides incentives to implement earlier, thus shrinking the entrepreneurial phase,
¢
E; and the size of the cycle, so that, with gradual adjustment, the economy converges to the new less volatile
steady state.
27Thus, the cyclical equilibrium is, at least super…cially, consistent with the results of Ramey and
Ramey (1995). Note however that this relationship does not represent the impact of volatility
on growth, nor the impact of growth on volatility. Rather it is an induced relationship due to
variation in the productivity of entrepreneurship.
5.3 Impact of a Tax on Producers
Shleifer (1986) shows that a tax on intermediate producers’ pro…ts could be used as a method
of dampening ‡uctuations. Consider the impact of such a tax, z, (or equivalently a subsidy to
entrepreneurs) that is redistributed back to households in a lump–sum fashion.
Proposition 8 A tax on production reduces average consumption volatility, but also reduces
long run growth.
The tax on producers a¤ects neither the asset market equilibrium nor the impact of the length
of the innovation phase on the size of the boom. Thus, the equilibrium values of ¡ and ¢E remain
unchanged. However, an increase in the tax rate means that the length of subsequent cycles must


















It follows that the equilibrium value of ¢ increases, so that long–run growth, ¡=¢, declines. The
longer cycles with no increase in recession depth or boom size, result in lower volatility. Not
surprisingly then a dampening tax comes at a cost, which did not appear in Shleifer since growth
was exogenous there.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has established the existence of cycles along a balanced growth path of a completely
standard multi–sectoral Schumpeterian growth model, that allows for the possibility of delayed
implementation and storage. Speci…cally, we show that: even with multiple sectors, in general
equilibrium, with reasonable assumptions on preferences, technology and market competition, no
static increasing returns to scale, no stochastic expectations, no threshold e¤ects, and rational
forward looking behavior, there exists a business cycle that is interlinked with the economy’s
28growth process. Moreover, we establish conditions under which a unique cycling equilibrium
arises. The equilibrium cycle’s necessary and su¢cient conditions, though conceptually com-
plicated, are relatively simple, and are only marginally more restrictive than those required to
generate the non-cycling (standard) equilibrium.
The endogenous cycles generated by our model have several features that we believe are crucial
to understanding real business cycles. First and foremost, the cyclical ‡uctuations are the result
of independent actions by decentralized decision–makers. They are not the result of economy–
wide shocks or economy–wide technological breakthroughs, but emerge as a result of pecuniary
demand externalities that induce coordination. This is true of both the boom, which re‡ects
Shleifer’s formalization of “animal spirits” in the joint implementation of innovations, and of the
downturn, which re‡ects the common incentives of entrepreneurs in anticipation of the upcoming
boom. Second, as in our cycle, the quantitative analyses of Emery and Koenig (1992), Sichel
(1993) and Balke and Wynne (1995), suggest that the average cycle starts with a growth spurt
which is then followed by a growth slowdown before the economy enters a period of relatively
constant decline during the recessionary phase. Thirdly, as is consistent with the …ndings of
Beaudry and Koop (1993), Pesaran and Potter (1997) and Altissimo and Violante (2001) there
is a positive feedback from downturns to subsequent cyclical upturns. Finally, the equilibrium
relationship between growth and volatility is negative, which is consistent with the cross–country
evidence of Ramey and Ramey (1995).
While we believe our analysis provides a useful step in understanding the endogenous linkages
between growth and business cycles, the basic model must be extended along several dimensions
before it can be compared with the data in any meaningful way. In particular, the nature of
the cycle generated by our simple model does not map very well into the data. Nevertheless, we
believe that the central mechanism we have described here is robust to various extensions which
we are currently developing and which we brie‡y outline below:
² Smoothing the cycle — The growth spurt and the start of the slowdown are unrealistically
abrupt. However, they can be made smoother by allowing for a period of learning–by–doing in
sectors with newly implemented innovations, such that maximum productivity is not achieved
immediately. In contrast to Shleifer (1986), innovations are not immediately imitated upon
implementation and incumbents retain their position for the duration of the cycle. So long as
…rms learn quickly enough to ensure that the initial wage exceeds the value of entrepreneurship,
29the cycle continues to exist.
² Unskilled Labour — The downturn in our cycle results from the allocation of labour to en-
trepreneurship in anticipation of the upcoming boom. Although measured labor productivity
falls during the downturn, real wages do not, so in this sense workers are not made worse o¤.
Introducing unskilled workers, workers who can only be used in production, yields more realistic
implications. In particular, although the unit cost of production remains constant over the cycle,
the wages of the skilled rise and the wages of the unskilled fall as the relative demand for skilled
workers rises in response to the approaching boom.
² Physical Investment — Although we allow for the possibility of storage we assume away physical
capital as a vehicle for smoothing aggregate consumption over time. In Shleifer’s (1986) model
introducing physical capital in a standard way would destroy the cyclical equilibrium because
households would try to consume the bene…ts of the boom in advance by dissaving. This would
not arise in our equilibrium. The reason is that a decline in production prior to the boom is
necessary in our model to free up resources for growth–promoting activities. Although it cannot
be optimal for consumption to jump discontinuously at the boom, output and investment would.
² Aggregate uncertainty — The length and other characteristics of real business cycles, vary from
cycle to cycle and look rather di¤erent from the deterministic equilibrium cycle described here.
However, introducing a degree of aggregate uncertainty would be possible without changing the
basic analysis. For example, the stochastic arrival of GPTs that raises productivity in all sectors,
say, would cause the size and length of booms and recessions between GPTs to vary over time.
306.1 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :From the household’s Euler equation we have












+ g(t) ¡ ±X(t) (60)
r(t)=
±(1 ¡ e¡°)(1 ¡ X(t))
e¡° + ±°X(t) ¡ ±X(t) (61)
In equating (58) and (61) and solving for the stationary allocation of labor to entrepreneurship
thus yields
X(t)=X¤ =
±(1 ¡ e¡°) ¡ ½e¡°
± ¡ (1 ¡ ¾)e¡°±°
: (62)
Substituting into (16) gives (20). Note that with ¾<1, the existence of a positive growth path
requires that ±(1¡e¡°) >½ e ¡° which rearranges to the second inequality in (19). Also for utility
to bounded and the transversality condition to hold requires that r(t) >g (t). Using (20) and
(58) a su¢cient condition given by the …rst inequality in (19).
P r o o fo fL e m m a1We show: (1) that if a signal of success from a potential entrepreneur is
credible, other entrepreneurs stop innovation in that sector; (2) given (1) entrepreneurs have no
incentive to falsely claim success.
Part (1): If entrepreneur i0s signal of success is credible then all other entrepreneurs believe that
i has a productivity advantage which is e° times better than the existing production methods. If
another entrepreneur continues to innovate in that sector, with positive probability they will also
develop a productive advantage of e°; the expected pro…t from implementing such an innovation is
0, since, in developing their improvement, they have not been able to observe the non-implemented
improvements of others, so that both …rms Bertrand compete with the same technology. Returns
to this are strictly less than attempting to innovate in another sector where there has been no
signal of success, or from simply working in production, w(t) > 0:
Part (2): Assuming success signals are credible, entrepreneurs know that upon success, further
innovation in their sector will cease from Part (1) by their sending of a costless signal. They are
31thus indi¤erent between falsely signalling success when it has not arrived, and sending no signal.
Thus, there exists a signalling equilibrium in which only successful entrepreneurs send a signal of
success.
















which re-arranges to (27):
Proof of Lemma 3: First note that in any preceding no-entrepreneurship phase, r(t)=½.
Thus, since, in a cycling equilibrium, the date of the next implementation is …xed at Tv; the
expected value of entrepreneurship, ±V D; also grows at the rate ½>0: Thus, if under X(TE
v )=0 ;
±V D(TE
v ) >w v; then the same inequality is also true the instant before, i.e. at t ! TE
v ,s i n c ewv
is constant within the cycle. But this violates the assertion that entrepreneurship commences at
TE
v : Thus necessarily, ±V D(TE













lnAi(Tv¡1)di =( 1¡ P (T))° (65)
Integrating (37) over the entrepreneurship phase yields the economy’s stock of accumulated knowl-


















which upon integration gives (39).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :The increase in output from the beginning of one cycle to the beginning
of the next re‡ects only the improvement in productivity y0(Tv)=e¡vy0(Tv¡1): Moreover, since
32all output is consumed it follows that c0(Tv)=e¡vc0(Tv¡1). This implies that the long run
discount factor is given by




In particular, since r(t)=0during the downturn,
¯(t)=¾¡v + ½¢E
v 8 t 2 (TE
v ;T v): (69)
Combining this with (44) and (45) yields (46).
Proof of Proposition 4: The discounted monopoly pro…ts from owning an innovation at time
Tv is given by
V I







r(s)dsy(¿)d¿ + P(Tv)e¡¯(Tv)V I
0 (Tv+1): (70)
Substituting for V I










































































Asset market clearing implies that
±V I
0 (Tv)=wv+1: (75)











































































v+1¡Tv) ¡ 1+( 1¡ P)
´
: (79)





















































Taking logs and noting that TE
v+1 ¡ Tv = Tv+1 ¡ Tv ¡ ¢E =¢ v ¡ ¢E yields (50).
Proof of Proposition 5: It is easily veri…ed that under the conditions in (54) there does exist
au n i q u et r i p l e( ¢E;¢;¡) > 0 which solves (39), (46) and (50). In addition, as described in the




(E2) V I(t) <VD(t) 8 t 2 (TE
v ;T v)
(E3) ±V I(t) <w (t) 8 t 2 (0;TE
v ):
We prove that each of these conditions hold in turn:
(E1) Since V I
0 (Tv+1)=e¡V I




Since ¯(Tv)=½¢+¾¡, condition (E1) requires that ½¢ > (1¡¾)¡; which must be true for the
consumer’s optimization problem to be bounded. Using (46), this condition simply requires that
34¢ > ¢E, which, from (50) is true as long as
½
±°(1¡¾) > 1 ¡e¡°: Since e¡° < 1, this strictly holds
if the …rst inequality in (54) is satis…ed.










V D(t) <VD(t) 8 t 2 (TE
v ;T v) (80)
















































When t = Tv, this becomes








































































35Since ±¢E > 1, q>1. Then, we can write
logP(Tv) ¡ logP(t) ·¡ q
½
¾









¸ 1 ¡ e¡q
½
¾(Tv¡t) (92)

















We know that (81), and hence (93), holds with equality at t = Tv. It follows that a su¢cient





























¾(Tv¡t) < 0 8 t 2 [TE












±<0 8 t (96)



















Since the l.h.s is increasing in ¢E, this condition says that ¢E must be su¢ciently large. Since







In Figure 2, at the positive intersection of (39) and (46), the former must be steeper than the








36It follows that a globally su¢cient condition for (E2) is again given by the …rst inequality in (54).
(E3) Long–run market clearing implies that
±V I(Tv¡1)=wv:
It follows that a su¢cient condition for (E3) is
dV I(t)
dt
< 0;8 t 2 (0;TE
v ):
The value of immediate implementation can be expressed as












v ) 8 t 2 (0;TE
v ) (100)
Since during this phase r(t)=½ and g =0 ,t h i si s









Di¤erentiating w.r.t. to t yields
dV I(t)
dt




If (54) holds then from (E2), we have that V I(TE
v ) <w v=± = e¡°y0(Tv¡1)=±,a n ds o
dV I(t)
dt
< ¡(1 ¡ e¡°)e¡½(TE







(1 ¡ e¡°)± ¡ ½e¡°¤
< 0: (104)
Where the last inequality follows from (54).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :Growth in the acyclical economy is given by ga in (20). In the cyclical




























since ln1 + x<xwe have






































[±(1 ¡ e¡°) ¡ ½e¡°]°
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¾)°e¡° = ga:
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 : Equation (39), computes the growth e¤ect of a given entrepreneurial
length and is thus independent of z. The same is true of the asset market clearing condition,
equation (46), since the tax is time invariant. However equation (50); the labour market clearing
condition, now becomes:
(1 ¡ z)±V D(t) · wv:
The corresponding change in equation (75) in the proof of Proposition (4) directly yields equation
(57): It follows that the equilibrium value of ¢ increases, so that long–run growth, ¡=¢, declines.
38References
[1] Aghion, Philippe and Howitt, Peter (1992), “A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruc-
tion,” Econometrica, vol. 60, 1992, pp. 323–351.
[2] Aghion, Philippe and Peter Howitt (1998) Endogenous Growth Theory, Cambridge MIT
Press.
[3] Aghion, Philippe, and Giles Saint Paul (1998) “Uncovering some causal relationships between
productivity growth and the structure of economic ‡uctuations: A tentative survey”, Labour,
12, 279-303.
[4] Altissimo, Filippo and Giovanni L. Violante (2001) “The non-linear dynamics of output and
unemployment in the US,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, forthcoming.
[5] Balke, N. and M. Wynne (1995), “Recession and recoveries in real business cycle models,”
Economic Inquiry, vol. 33, pp. 640-663.
[6] Beaudry, P. and G. Koop (1993) “Do recessions permanently a¤ect output?” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 31, 149-163.
[7] Beaudry, P. and E. van Wincoop (1996), “The Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution: An
Exploration using a US Panel of State Data” Economica, 63, 495.
[8] Caballero, R. and M. Hammour (1995) “The cleansing e¤ect of recessions,” American Eco-
nomic Review 84, 1350-1368.
[9] Cheng, L.K. and E. Dinopoulos (1992), “Schumpeterian Growth and Stochastic Economic
Fluctuations,” mimeo, University of Florida.
[10] Dellas, H. and P. Sakellaris (1997) “On the cyclicality of schooling: theory and evidence,”
mimeo, University of Maryland.
[11] Emery, K.M. and E.F. Koenig (1992) “Forecasting turning points: is a two-state characteri-
zation of the business cycle appropriate?” Economics Letters, vol. 39, pp. 431-435.
[12] Evans, George W., Seppo Honkapohja and Paul Romer (1998), “Growth Cycles,” American
Economic Review, vol. 88 (3), pp. 495–515.
39[13] Francois, Patrick and Shouyong Shi (1999), “Welfare Improving Cycles,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 86, pp. 226-257.
[14] Freeman, Scott, Dong Pyo Hong and Dan Peled, “Endogenous Cycles and Growth with
Indivisible Technological Developments, ” Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 2, pp. 403–
432.
[15] Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (1991), Innovation and Growth in the Global Econ-
omy, Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
[16] Hall, Robert E. (2000) “Reorganization” Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public
Policy; 52(0), 1-22.
[17] Helpman, E. and M. Trajtenberg (1998), “A Time to Sow and a Time to Reap: Growth Based
on General Purpose Technologies.” in Elhanan Helpman (ed.), General Purpose Technologies
and Economic Growth, Cambridge: MIT Press.
[18] Jovanovic, Boyan and Lach, Saul (1997) Product Innovation and the Business Cycle,
International-Economic-Review; 38(1), pages 3-22.
[19] Jovanovic, Boyan and Rafael Rob (1990), “Long Waves and Short Waves: Growth through
Intensive and Extensive Search,” Econometrica, vol. 58, pp. 1391–1409.
[20] Lucas, Robert, E. Jr. (1987) Models of Business Cycles, Basil Blackwell.
[21] Matsuyama, Kiminori(1999), “Growing Through Cycles,” Econometrica,
[22] Pesaran, M.H. and S. M. Potter (1997) A ‡oor and ceiling model of US output, Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 21, 661-696.
[23] Ramey, G. and V. A. Ramey (1995), “Cross–Country Evidence on the Link Between Volatil-
ity and Growth,” American Economic Review, vol. 85, pp. 1138–1151.
[24] Sakellaris, P. and A. Spilimbergo (2000) “Business Cycles and Investment in Human Capi-
tal: International Evidence on Higher Education” Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on
Public Policy, 52, 221-56.
[25] Schumpeter, Joseph (1927), “The Explanation of the Business Cycle,” Economica December
1927, pp. 286–311.
40[26] Schumpeter, Joseph (1950), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3rd edition, New York,
1950.
[27] Segerstrom, Paul S., T. C. A. Anant and Elias Dinopoulos (1990) A Schumpeterian Model
of the Product Life Cycle American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 5. (Dec., 1990), pp.
1077-1091
[28] Shleifer, Andrei (1986), “Implementation Cycles,” Journal of Political Economy, 1986, vol.
94 (6), pp. 1163–1190.
[29] Sichel, D.E. (1989) “Business Cycle Asymetry: A Deeper Look,” Economic Inquiry,3 1 ,
224-36.
[30] Zarnowitz, Victor (1998), “Has the Business Cycle been Abolished?” NBER Working Paper
6367.
41